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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TOM RAMSEY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
BRUCE HANCOCK, FIRST SECURITY 
BANK OF UTAH, N.A., and 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10 
Defendants/Appellee. 
Case No. 20020530-CA 
INTRODUCTION 
The Defendant/Appellee, First Security Bank, in its Brief set forth as its 
reason for the Court affirming the Trial Court's granting of its Motion to Dismiss First 
Security Bank, N.A. as a Defendant that First Security Bank owed no duty to the 
Plaintiff who was not a customer of First Security, where it cashed approximately 
twenty-three checks for its own customer, all bearing forged endorsements or no 
endorsements. (Appellee Br. at 5 and 14) 
THE APPELLEE MISTAKENLY ARGUES THAT BOTH CASE 
LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND UTAH CASE LAW 
SUPPORTS THE PROPOSTION THAT THE APPELLEE OWED 
NO DUTY TO APPELLANT BY REASON OF ITS CASHING OR 
DEPOSITING SOME TWENTY-THREE CHECKS, ALL 
PAYABLE TO APPELLANT AND THE ENDORSEMENT 
EITHER BEING FORGED BY A CUSTOMER OF THE 
APPELLEE OR BEING DEPOSITED IN ITS CUSTOMER'S 
ACCOUNT AT AN OFFICE OF THE APPELLEE WITH NO 
ENDORSEMENTS. 
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The Appellee at Page 4, to support its position that First Security Bank owed 
no duty to the Appellant for depositing some twenty-three checks made payable to the 
Appellant, each bearing a forged endorsement of the Appellee's customer or in the 
alternative no endorsement at all, cites the cases of Volpev Fleet National Bank, 710 
A 2d 661,664 (R.I. 1998) and IBP, Inc v Mercantile Bank ofTopeka, 6 Fed Supp 2d 
1255, 1265 (D.Kan 1998). 
The facts of the present case are distinguishable from the facts of each of those 
cases. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in the Volpe case at page 661 first stated 
that the facts show that there was a single check which bore the forged endorsement of 
an insurance check made payable to the Appellant's attorney and the Appellant. In 
making its ruling, the Court first stated that the bank owed no duty to Appellant, a 
noncustomer, in negotiating the forged instrument. The distinguishing aspect of that 
case is where the Court found that the Bank had acted in a commercially reasonable 
manner in negotiating the check. 
The bank in the Volpe case filed an answer in which it alleged first that the 
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that at all 
times Fleet acted in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial 
standards in the banking industry. Fleet Bank then filed for summary judgment 
asserting the same reasons that were set forth in its answer. The trial court entered 
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summary judgment for Fleet. {Id. at 662) 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, consistent with the law of the State of 
Utah, stated that "in passing upon the propriety of an order granting summary 
judgment, this court, like the trial court, must examine the pleadings, affidavits, and 
other submitted materials in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion to 
determine whether any genuine issues of material fact are in dispute. {Id. at 662) 
The Court stated that it is incontrovertible that the law imposes upon the bank 
the duty of knowing the signature of its depositors. {Id. at 663) The Court in deciding 
for the bank stated "in the present case plaintiff does not dispute the fact that Fleet 
was acting in good faith, nor does she claim to be a customer of Fleet or an individual 
possessing any other kind of relationship with the bank. Further, plaintiff failed to 
present any facts to the motion showing that Fleet knew or had reason to know that the 
settlement check contained Volpe's forged endorsement when its customer, Jackvony, 
presented the check for deposit. Nor is there evidence that Fleet should have known 
from the face of the instrument or from the manner in which it was endorsed that the 
instrument was forged." (Id. at 664-665) The holding could not be applied to First 
Security Bank which cashed very substantial checks without endorsements. 
The Defendant, First Security Bank, N. A., in its brief, cites the case of Roy 
Supply Inc v Wells Fargo Bank N.A. 46 Cal. Rep. 2nd 309 (Cal App 3 Dis 1995) The 
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issue on appeal was whether the President of Roy Supply could maintain individually 
a cause of action where Roy Supply did not report forgeries of its checks for over a 
year after it received the bank statements. The Court held that because the forged 
checks were drawn on the corporate plaintiffs's checking accounts, and because the 
Bank had no commercial relationship with Roy involving these accounts, the Bank did 
not owe a duty of care to Roy personally. {Id. at 311) This case is not on point 
because it involved a claim of the President of a company against the bank.. 
First Security Bank at page 6 of its brief cites the case of Schleicher v Western 
State Bank 314 N. W. 2nd 293 (N.D. 1982) to support its position that the Bank owes 
no duty to inspect checks deposited in its customers account bearing forged 
endorsements. The Schleicher case involves facts totally unrelated to the facts of this 
case. The payee on a single check cashed at the defendant bank brought an action 
against the bank after he was charged with theft of property and sought damages for 
malicious prosecution, defamation, libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, invasion of privacy, return of proceeds of check he was alleged to have 
forged, and punitive damages. The trial court granted judgment to Bank and Plaintiff 
appealed. The check that Schleicher cashed bore a forged payor's signature. The 
check was given to Plaintiff by a hitchhiker who the Plaintiff had picked up. The 
Plaintiff endorsed the check and purchased a cashier's check at the Defendant Bank. 
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The bank requested that the Plaintiff reimburse it for the amount of the check. 
The Plaintiff was arrested, but two weeks later the complaint was dismissed. 
Plaintiff brought this action against the bank and upon the motion for summary 
judgment brought by the bank, the trial court granted summary judgment. The 
Plaintiff appealed. The Court first stated that "this court has restricted the use of 
summary judgment when it is sought in negligence actions. Generally, we have stated 
that negligence cases by their very nature are poor subjects for summary judgment. 
(Id. at 395) The affidavit filed by the bank in support of its motion for summary 
judgment stated that it played no part in the commencement of the investigation of 
Schleicher. The court in this case distinguished the case of Weidner v. Engelhardt 176 
N.W. 2d, 509 (N.D. 1970) when it stated that "one of the reasons summary judgment 
was reversed in that action, is that it was granted before the plaintiff had time to 
conduct pretrial discovery. That is not the situation here. Not only had 2 lA years 
elapsed between the issuance of the complaint and the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment, but Schleicher was given additional time after the hearing to 
submit an affidavit from the policeman who contacted the Bank. An affidavit never 
was submitted and the Court concluded there was not an issue of a material fact. In 
contradiction to Weidner, the court in the present case granted summary judgment 
before any pre-trial discovery could be accomplished. 
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In affirming the decision of the trial court to grant the bank summary judgment 
the court stated that "we decide under these facts the Bank did not have the duty to the 
payee of a forged check to compare the signature of the payor with its signature card 
in order to determine the authenticity of the payor's signature where the payee is not a 
customer or depositor". {Schleicher v Western States Bank 314 N.W. 2nd 297 (N.D. 
1982) 
The Appellee, First Security Bank, N.A. also quotes the cases of Bank of'Polska 
Kas Opieki, SA. v Pamrapo Savings Bank S.L.A, 980 F Supp (D.N.J 1995); E. F. 
Hutton Mortgage Corp v Equitable Bank N.A. 678 F. Supp 567 (D. Md 1988) and 
Pennsylvania Nat 7 Turf Club, Inc v. Bank of West Jersey 385 A. 2nd 932 (N. J. Super. 
Ct App Div 1978) in support of its contention that First Security Bank owed no duty 
to the Plaintiff, a non-depositor of the bank. 
A careful analysis of these cases indicates that none of the three cases involves 
facts even similar to the present case. The Bank of Polska involved a two million 
dollar cashiers check that contained a forged endorsement. The action was brought by 
the drawer bank against the drawee bank and the depository bank for damages. The 
Court in granting summary judgment to Pamrapo stated that because the $2,000,000 
check was not "drawn, issued, or indorsed" to Bank Polska, Bank Polska is not its 
holder or owner, and therefore lacks a proprietary interest sufficient to confer standing 
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to sue for conversion against the depositary bank. (Bank ofPolska Kas Opieki, S.A. v 
Pamrapo Savings BankS.L.A, 980 F Supp 952 (D.N.J 1995) The Court further stated 
that "policy reasons also militate against recognizing a conversion cause of action 
under these circumstances. (Id. at 953-954) Allowing a drawer to sue the depositary 
bank for conversion, particularly when, as here, the drawer is accused of negligence, 
would violate the intention of the drafters of the U.C.C. to require the drawer to seek 
recourse from its own drawee bank. (Id. at 953-954) 
The E. F. Hutton Mortgage Corporation case involved the issue of who should 
bear the loss when the client of both the Plaintiff and the Defendant both lost where 
their client's principal officer committed fraud in the sale of second and third 
mortgages. The Court held that since both the Plaintiff and the Defendant were 
victims of their client's fraud, each should bear their own loss. The Plaintiff argued 
that since the Defendant knew of the client's fraud, it should be held liable to the 
Plaintiff. The Court ruled that the Defendant owed no duty to the Plaintiff concerning 
what it may or may not have known about client and its business operations. (E. F. 
Hutton Mortgage Corp v Equitable Bank, N.A. 678 F. Supp 379 (D. Md 1988). 
Lastly, First Security Bank relies on the Pennsylvania National Turf Club, Inc 
case to support its position. However, that case involved facts substantially different 
from the Plaintiffs case. In that case the Plaintiff would cash checks drawn by 
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Defendant's depositor under circumstances where the Plaintiff knew that there was 
insufficient funds to cover the checks. The bank had an arrangement with its 
customer that it would notify the customer of the amount of the overdraft and the 
customer would deposit cash to cover the overdraft. 
This arrangement continued for some time, but eventually the customer stopped 
depositing cash to cover the overdrafts. When this happened the Bank unsuccessfully 
tried to contact the customer. Then the Bank tried to return all the checks that were 
not covered by account balances. Twenty-three checks were returned after the 
midnight deadline, and three checks were returned prior to the deadline. The Court 
held that the bank was liable for the checks returned after the midnight deadline and 
the Plaintiff was liable for loss on checks returned prior to the mid-night deadline. 
{Pennsylvania Natl Turf Club, Inc v. Bank of West Jersey 385 A. 2nd 935 (N. J. Super. 
CtAppDivl978). 
Finally, First Security Bank cites the case of Arrow Industries, IncvZions First 
National Bank 767 P 2d 935 (Utah 1988). The issue in the Arrow Industries case was 
whether the trial court committed error in granting summary judgment to the Bank 
where it was alleged that the bank returned insufficient funds checks contrary to the 
parties' agreement to hold the checks for 30 days. 
In the initial complaint filed by the Plaintiff it was alleged that the process of 
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collecting checks engaged in by Zions in this instance was one that arose out of 
common banking custom and Zions breached its duty and failed to exercise ordinary 
care by wrongfully returning the checks. The trial court initially concluded that the 
pleadings failed to advance a theory of negligence that would support a recovery and 
dismissed Arrow's cause of action. Thereafter, Arrow was permitted to amend its 
cause of action and allege breach of contract on two theories: (1) breach of the 
contract between Zions and its depositor, Rocky Mountain, to which Arrow was a 
third-party beneficiary, and (2) breach of a fiduciary duty under a contract of agency. 
As part of its complaint, Arrow alleged that Zions was a creditor of Rocky Mountain 
and that by returning the checks unpaid, Zions wrongfully enhanced its position as a 
secured party to the inventory for which the checks were payment. (Id. at 936) 
Zions brought a second motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion was supported by written memoranda, 
affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and Arrow's responsive memoranda and 
affidavits. Hence, the motion was appropriately treated as one for summary judgment. 
The Court stated that a motion to dismiss is only appropriate where it appears to a 
certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which 
could be proved in support of its claim. In reviewing an order granting a motion to 
dismiss, the court is obligated to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 
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the plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. {Id. at 936). 
The Court held the bank, irrespective of contractual attempts at exculpation, 
owed its customers a duty of due care and good faith. {Id. at 938) The court in 
reversing the Trial Court's granting of the motion to dismiss held that the Plaintiffs 
allegations that Zions breached its duty and failed to exercise ordinary care by 
wrongfully returning the checks in question, while allowing other checks to be paid to 
other payee's of deposited checks were true. This claim together with others alleged 
and the principles noted above, were sufficient to preclude dismissal under rule 
12(b)(6). {Id at 939) 
Nowhere in the Arrow case does it support the claim of First Security Bank, that 
First Security Bank owed no duty to the Plaintiff by reason of its payment of twenty 
three checks made payable to the Plaintiff and a portion of which bore endorsements 
forged by a customer of First Security Bank and deposited in the customers account. 
Even more damaging is the fact that First Security Bank deposited some checks in the 
bank's customer's account payable to plaintiff which bore no endorsements by 
anyone. 
This is a case of first impression. Research of Utah case law finds no case 
where the Court has held that the depositing bank owes a duty to the payee of the 
checks, where the checks bear forged endorsements and no decisions regarding checks 
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cashed without endorsement. This is made more exculpatory by the fact that it 
involved not a single check, but twenty-three checks over a substantial period of time. 
Further, the bank did not follow normal banking procedures when it deposited checks 
in its customer's account, made payable to the Plaintiff, which contained no 
endorsement whatsoever. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff respectfully request that this court reverse 
the Order of the trial court granting the Defendant's motion to summarily dismiss the 
bank as a defendant in the above entitled action prior to the Defendant, First Security 
Bank filing an answer to the Plaintiffs complaint and prior to Plaintiffs ability to 
conduct discovery to determine if there were circumstances in the conduct of First 
Security Bank or its personnel that would demonstrate that First Security Bank did not 
exercise ordinary care in allowing Defendant, Hancock, to deposit Plaintiffs checks 
in Hancock's account at First Security Bank. Further, to determine if Hancock was 
indebted to First Security Bank and whether any of the funds derived from these 
checks were used to pay Hancock's indebtedness to First Security Bank. 
DATED this l^f day of A p p l ^ 0 0 r ^ > ^ p ^ 5 ^ = ^ - - ^ 
—BERNAmt^S^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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